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## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

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ORLANDO D. HARVEY,	)		
Plaintiff,	) Civil Action No. 7:06cv00066		
v.	) <u>MEMORANDUM OPINION</u>		
T.L. WASHINGTON,	)		
Defendants.	) By: Jackson L. Kiser		
	) Senior U.S. District Judge		

Plaintiff Orlando D. Harvey, a Virginia inmate proceeding <u>prose</u>, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction vested under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Lynchburg Adult Detention Cener he was subjected to excessive use of force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harvey makes no specific request for relief. After reviewing his complaint, I find that Harvey has failed to raise any claim of constitutional magnitude and, therefore, dismiss his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Harvey alleges that defendant Correctional Officer Washington slammed Harvey's hands and arms in the tray slot when Harvey refused to obey Washington's order to remove his hands from the tray slot, so that Washington could shut the opening. Harvey has not alleged he suffered any injury as a result of having his fingers and/or arms closed in the slot.

A petition may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it is clear from the petition that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he has been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that such deprivation is a result of conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). However, a complaint filed by an inmate challenging the conduct of an "officer or employee of a governmental entity" may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) if the complaint is "frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."

The Eighth Amendment protects individuals against excessive prison sentences, as well as inhumane treatment and excessive force while imprisoned. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To establish an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against a prison official, an inmate must satisfy a two-prong standard comprised of both an objective inquiry (whether the harm plaintiff suffered was sufficiently serious enough to amount to a constitutional violation) and a subjective inquiry (whether the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind). Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (1996).

The subjective component of an excessive force claim requires an inmate to demonstrate that the force used by an institutional official, "inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In evaluating such a claim, "the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 32-21 (1986)). The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have set out the following factors to consider in determining whether a prison official acted maliciously and sadistically: "the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotations omitted); Williams, 77 F.3d at 762. Also, the inmate must prove the correction official's actions were "objectively harmful enough' to offend 'contemporary standards of decency." Stanley v. Hejirika, 134 F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 1998)

(quoting <u>Hudson</u>, 503 U.S. at 8). Although there is no requirement that an inmate suffer "serious" or "significant" pain or injury to demonstrate that a malicious or sadistic use of force was employed, he must allege "more than a <u>de minimis</u> pain or injury." <u>Norman v. Taylor</u>, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1994). "[A]bsent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injury is <u>de minimis</u>." <u>Taylor v. McDuffie</u>, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1998). However, a <u>de minimis</u> physical injury may amount to an Eighth Amendment violation if the force used was of the sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." In <u>Norman v. Taylor</u>, the Fourth Circuit stated:

We recognize that there may be highly unusual circumstances in which a particular application of force will cause relatively little, or perhaps no, enduring injury, but nonetheless will result in an impermissible infliction of pain. In these circumstances, we believe that either the force used will be "of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind," and thus expressly outside the <u>de minimis</u> force exception, or the pain itself will be such that it can properly be said to constitute more than <u>de minimis</u> injury.

## 25 F.3d at 1263, n. 4 (citations omitted).

According to Harvey, Washington slammed his arm and fingers in the tray slot; however, he has not alleged that he suffered any injury as a result of this incident. Furthermore, Harvey has failed to allege any facts which establish those extraordinary circumstances on which a plaintiff can prevail on an excessive force claim when he suffers only de minimis injury. Taylor, 155 F.3d at 483. "[N]ot...every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir. 1997). And merely a lack of due care for the prisoner's

interests and safety fails to show the use of force which is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)(finding that the infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense).

Although Harvey claims that Washington slammed his arms and fingers in the tray slot, he admits that he repeatedly refused the officer's order to remove his hands from the slot so that the opening may be closed and latched. And, as an inmate can reasonably expect to have his arms or fingers pinched in the tray slot when he refuses to remove them following a direct order to remove his appendages so that the tray slot may be closed, I find that this does not present those "extraordinary" circumstances in which a plaintiff can prevail on an excessive force claim when he suffers only de minimis injury. See Taylor, 155 F.3d at 483.

Based on the foregoing, I find that Harvey has not presented any claims on which relief can be granted. Therefore, I will dismiss the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1).

The plaintiff is advised that he may appeal this decision pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure by filing a notice of appeal with this court within 30 days of the date of entry of this Order, or within such extended period as the court may grant pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5).

The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this memorandum opinion and accompanying order to plaintiff and to counsel of record for the defendants, if known.

ENTER: This 27th day of January, 2006.

Senjor United States District Judge